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Abstract—Today’s power systems become more prone to cyber-
attacks due to the high integration of information technologies. In 
this paper, we demonstrate that the outages of some lines can be 
masked by injecting false data into a set of measurements. The 
success of the topology attack can be guaranteed by making that: 
1)the injected false data obeys KCL and KVL to avoid being 
detected by the bad data detection program in the state estimation; 
2)the residual is increased such that the line outage cannot be 
detected by PMU data. A quadratic programming problem is set 
up to determine the optimal attack vector that can maximize the 
residual of the outaged line. The IEEE 39-bus system is used to 
demonstrate the masking scheme.  
Index Terms—false data injection attacks, phasor measurement 
unit, line outage detection, power systems.  
NOMENCLATURE 
  sufficiently large value for line power flow 
  residual value 
  given maximum percentage of change for load 
measurement attack 
  
b,d i, j, subscript: index for buses 
    subscript: index for lines 
  
   number of loads 
  
  set of PMU buses 
   set of load buses 
   set of lines 
      set of buses with PMUs 
      set of lines covered by PMUs 
  
    false data injected into the measurement at bus   
    false data injected into the measurement on line   
  
  power flow of line   before attacks 
    additional power flow of line    due to false data 
injection 
       additional bus power injection vector with/without 
false data injection 
    total false power injection at bus   
  
  bus susceptance matrix  
     bus susceptance matrix after line outage 
  load vector 
   false data injection vector into load measurements 
  line flow vector  
   false data vector of line measurements 
  Jacobian matrix 
     power injection vector before attacks 
     power injection vector 
        equivalent power injection vector after line   
outaged without false data 
       
  equivalent power injection vector after line   
outaged with false data 
  shift factor matrix of the power grid 
   row k of   
  bus-generator incidence matrix 
  bus-load incidence matrix 
  bus-line incidence matrix 
  measurement vector 
   measurement error injected by the attacking vector 
  phase angle vector 
   incremental phase angle vector  
     phase angle vector before attacks 
        phase angle vector after line   outaged without false 
data injection 
       
  phase angle vector after line   outaged with false 
data injection 
      observed phase angle change vector of PMU buses 
after line   is outaged 
     
    calculated phase angle change vector of PMU buses 
after line   is outaged 
     
  extended vector of       
       
  bus phase angle change vector after line   is outaged 
with false data injection 
Note that   represents incremental change and symbols in bold 
represent vectors or matrices.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
OWER grid, one of the critical infrastructures, is the 
backbone of a nation’s economy and is critical to the 
homeland security. In particular, the blackouts happened 
around the globe in recent years have raised a great concern 
about the reliable and safe operation of power systems. In fact, 
some blackouts are triggered by the initial failures of a small 
number of components [1]. However, the control center was 
not aware of the potential risk or even did not detect such 
failures, thus no corrective measures were taken to mitigate the 
risk. As a result, the failures of the components triggered the 
failures of more components and finally led to the blackout. 
From the perspective of the system operator, it is essential to 
monitor the real-time operation state of a power system and 
detect the failures of components in time. To achieve this goal, 
an increasing number of traditional sensors as well as PMUs 
P 
are being installed to collect bus voltages, line flows and etc., 
and then transmit these data into the control center via 
communication networks.  
   On the other side, the tight integration between information 
communication technologies and the physical components in 
power systems makes power systems more vulnerable to cyber 
attacks. Consequently, an attacker has a chance to compromise 
the data generated by the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems to confuse or misguide the state 
estimation. Liu et al. in [2] demonstrated that these attacks 
against state estimation can be undetectable by injecting the 
pre-designed false data into meters if the full topology and 
parameter information of a power grid is assumed to be known. 
Based on the corrupted data, the control center may make 
wrong decisions that lead to economic loss or insecure 
operations. Driven by the pioneering work in [2], extensive 
researches have been done to investigate the impacts of false 
data injection attacks on the economic and reliable operation of 
power systems [3]-[15]. In particular, we in [14] and [15] 
showed that an attacker only needs to obtain the network 
information of the attacking region instead of that of the entire 
power network. This is done by making sure that the variations 
of phase angles of all boundary buses connected to the same 
island of the non-attacking region are the same.  
Recently, several works have been done to reveal that an 
attack can also change the real-time topology of a power grid 
that is sent to the control center. Following the same principle 
in [2], the authors in [16] showed that the topology information 
sent to the control center can be attacked. They proposed a 
state-preserving model for a single line attack, in which a pair 
of additional powers is injected into the power measurements 
at the terminal buses of the attacked line. To overcome the 
practical issues in [16], we proposed a practical topology 
attack model [17] in which the attacking amount at a bus is 
limited within a certain range and a heuristic algorithm was 
proposed to minimize the efforts of obtaining the network 
information for constructing a feasible attack vector.  Li et al. 
in [18] minimized the required network information by 
replacing the external network with its equivalent network 
based on the corresponding measurements.  This type of 
topology attacks could bring in serious consequences to the 
operation of power systems. In particular, a wise attacker will 
choose a perfect attacking time, for example, when a system is 
under stressed condition and the outage of a critical line might 
lead to cascading failures. If such an outage is masked by an 
attacker and the control center has no way to detect the outage 
of the line, no actions will be taken and catastrophic 
consequences may follow. Thus, the security of the topology 
information of a power grid is worth to pay much attention. 
However, the proposed topology attack model in [16]-[18] 
is only suitable for the power grid without PMUs deployed for 
line outage detection. Since a set of PMUs have been deployed 
in power systems, it is necessary for the defender to 
reinvestigate the possibility of topology attacks by considering 
the protection role of PMUs. When a line is outaged, the bus 
phase angles at the PMU buses will change, which allow a 
defender to detect the outage of the line by utilizing the 
advantages of PMU data. In [19], the authors proposed a single 
line outage detection model based on the known network 
information and PMU data at a subset of buses. In their model, 
an enumeration approach was used to compute the responding 
residual value for each line. If the residual of a line is less than 
a predetermined threshold value, then this line is thought to be 
outaged. Considering the current costs of deploying PMUs are 
still expensive, the authors in [20] further explored the optimal 
placement strategy for PMUs. The objective is to minimize the 
number of PMUs to be deployed which maximizing the 
distance differences between every two-line outage 
combination.  
Thus, to achieve an undetectable attack, two conditions must 
be met: (1) the injected false data can avoid the bad data 
detection in state estimation; (2) the line outage cannot be 
detected by PMU data sent to the control center. In this paper, 
we will investigate the possibility of making line outages by 
injecting false data. Our focus is to mask the outage of a single 
line. The main contributions of this paper are three-fold: 
(1) We for the first time demonstrate that line outage can be 
masked by disrupting the PMU data based outage 
detection by injecting false data. The principle is to 
increase the residual between the observed PMU angle 
changes and the calculated angle changes at the PMU 
buses.  
(2) We derive the analytical expression for the residual due to 
false data and mathematically explain the principle of 
increasing the residual by injecting false data. A quadratic 
programming problem is proposed to determine the 
optimal attack vector that maximizes the residual of the 
outaged line. 
(3) Our work reveals the vulnerability of the real-time 
topology to cyber-attacks and thus highlights the necessity 
for a defender to develop some effective protection 
strategies and corresponding detection methods.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
reviews the concept of bad data attacks. Section III proposes a 
masking scheme to hide the outage of a single line. Section IV 
demonstrates the proposed model with the IEEE 39-bus system. 
Section V concludes the paper.  
II. REVIEW OF FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS 
In the transmission network, the bus voltages are around the 
rating voltage and the phase angle differences of the terminal 
buses of a line is small. These characteristics allow us to 
describe the power flows using the linear Direct Current (DC) 
model.  Based on DC power flow, we have 
                                                  (1) 
                                                    (2) 
where matrix   is the susceptance matrix  
                                           (3) 
Combining (1)-(3) into a compact form, we get  
                                               (4) 
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In DC state estimation, the state vector  ̂ is estimated by the 
least square method 
 ̂                                          (5) 
where   is the vector of measurements, and   is the Jacobian 
matrix of the power grid. 
To check the validity of the transmitted data, the control 
center will perform bad data test which calculates the 2-norm 
value, or residue, of the error vector between the real 
measurements and corresponding estimated values. The 
residue   is  
  ‖    ̂‖
 
                                   (6) 
If the residue is less than a given threshold value, the 
estimated state  ̂ is acceptable. Otherwise, bad data is thought 
to be existing. Thus, while performing the attacks, the attacker 
has to avoid being detected by bad data test. In particular, if the 
injection false data vector    and the state variation vector     
satisfy       , then we have 
‖     ̂   ‖  ‖      ( ̂    )‖   
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      (7) 
That is, the residue   will not increase, so false data 
injection attacks on measurements can bypass the residual test.  
The disadvantage of the general false data injection model is 
the lack of considerations of practical conditions of real power 
systems. For example, a strong mutual communication is 
usually built between a power plant and control center, so there 
is a high risk of being detected if an attacker chooses to attack 
the measurement at a generator bus. Additionally, the control 
center would doubt the data if the injecting false data is too 
large since the state estimator has the pre-knowledge of the 
load distribution of a power network and can predict loads 
using load forecasting techniques.  
To make the false data injection attack model more practical, 
Yuan et al. in [3] proposed a load redistribution attack model 
which sets some constraints on the general attack model: (1) 
The output reading of a generator cannot be altered; (2) The 
readings of the measurement at a load bus can be attacked 
within certain ranges. The mathematical model can be 
formulates as 
∑      
  
                                      (8) 
            (     )                   (9) 
                                           (10) 
Constraint (8) ensures that summation of injection powers at 
load buses equals to zero since the readings of generators 
cannot be changed. Constraint (9) limits the attacking amount 
within a certain range. Constraint (10) constructs the 
corresponding attacking vector of line measurements.  
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
   In this section, we first propose the masking principle of line 
outages, and then formulate a quadratic programming problem 
to determine the optimal attack vector.     
A. Principle of masking line outages 
In power systems, the topology of a power grid provides the 
basis for economic operations and security controls. However, 
it is not invariable due to natural or malicious attacks or 
intentional line switching. Thus, to monitor the real-time 
topology of a power network, it is essential for the control 
center to detect the outages of lines.  
In practice, when a line is physically disconnected, 0 will be 
sent to the control center to represent the line is disconnected. 
However, an attacker aims to stealthily modify this information 
from 1 to 0 so that the control center believes the line is still 
connected. 
To ensure that such topology attack will not be detected by 
the state estimator, as discussed in [14], the injected false data 
should obey KCL and KVL.  When a line   is disconnected, 
the topology of the power grid will change. Accordingly, the 
power flow is determined using a new shift factor     . 
However, consider the objective of an attacker is to mask the 
outage of this line. That is, the power flow should be consistent 
with the case that line k is still connected. So, the power flow is 
determined using the original shift factor   before the line 
outage. In this case, the received data will be trusted by the 
control center, the outage of this line is masked.   
As discussed in Section I, the deployment of PMUs enables 
a defender to detect the outages of some lines based on PMU 
data. Thus, the success of such a topology attack not only 
needs the injected false data pass the bad data detection 
procedure in the state estimation, but also requires that the 
injected data can ensure the outage cannot be detected by PMU 
data. Next, we first introduce the general mechanism of line 
outage detection using PMU phasor data. 
Before the outage, the phase angle vector is calculated by 
      
                                      (11) 
Similarly, the post-outage phase angle vector is calculated 
by 
            
                                   (12) 
As shown in Fig. 1, the line outage can be simulated by 
injecting additional powers        at the terminal buses of 
the outaged line while keeping the topology of the power 
network unchanged [21]. That is, the outaged line is still 
assumed to be in service. By doing so, the recalculation of the 
matrix     
   for each outaged line can be avoided.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Simulation of line outage 
Accordingly, the post-outage power injection vector 
becomes  
                                                (13) 
where vector   is defined as  
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    The additional power injection    is calculated by (14) 
       
                                     (14) 
where   
  is the pre-outage flow of line   and   is calculated as 
follows. 
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Accordingly, (12) becomes 
         
                                         (15) 
Then, the calculated phase angle changes at PMU buses are 
given by (16) 
     
    (       )  (    )                      (16) 
where the subscript   represents only the rows in         and 
     corresponding to the PMU buses are selected to calculate 
     
   .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Principle of masking line outage detection 
 
To detect if there is line outage and which line is on outage, 
we assume that line   is out of service and then calculate 
        
 ‖           
   ‖
 
                    (17) 
where       is the observed phase angle change vector at 
PMU buses before and after the outage of line  . The original 
line flow   
 , which is before the outage of line  , is allowed to 
be variable to achieve the best match [19]. 
As shown in figure 2, without false data injection, the 
residual    in (17) should be small since       and      
    are 
determined according to similar system conditions. It has been 
proved that the outage of a single line can be effectively 
detected based on the residual between       and      
   . The 
candidate line whose outage results in the minimum residual 
value is determined as the outaged line. That is, for each 
candidate line  , we calculate its corresponding residual    
according to (17). The outaged line   is determined by 
examining the values of the residuals: 
                                               (18) 
 Line   that has the minimum residual value is identified as 
the outaged line.  
Notice that       comes from the actual readings of PMUs 
and thus represents the change of PMU phase angles before 
and after the line outage. In comparison,      
    is calculated 
using (17) according to the received measurements from 
remote sensors. This allows an attacker to control      
    by 
compromising the measurements transmitted from the power 
grid due to the vulnerability of communication networks. As 
shown in Fig. 2, if an attacker injects false data   , then      
    
is calculated using the corrupted data        . But       
still comes from the readings of PMUs that follow the system 
condition without false data injection. In this case,       and 
     
    are determined based on two different system conditions, 
making the resulting residual large. As a result, the outage of 
this line cannot be detected if its residual is increased to be 
greater than the minimum one. From the perspective of an 
attacker, in order to mask the outage of line, the goal is to 
increase the residual such that it is not the minimum one 
among the residuals of all candidate lines. 
B. Construction of attack vector 
In this section, we will present the optimization model for 
determining the optimal attack vector.  
As mentioned before,      
    is calculated based on DC 
power flow, so it obeys the superposition law. If there is a false 
data vector    injected into the power grid, then    in (13) 
becomes 
         
                                 (19) 
where     is attributed to the false injection data    
                                             (20) 
Under the disruption of injected false data, the equivalent 
post-outage power injection vector is  
       
               
                         (21) 
Then, the phase angle vector after line   is outaged can be 
calculated as 
       
            
                           (22) 
According to the principle of line outage detection discussed 
in Section A, to mask the outage of line  , an attacker needs to 
maximize the residual in (17), 
    ‖           
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                          (23) 
Define a diagonal matrix   with all entries corresponding to 
the PMU buses being 1. Extend vector       to an     
column vector      
  with all entries for PMU buses being 
from       and those for non-PMU set to zeros.  
Then, we have 
‖           
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 ‖       
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  (24) 
where        
  is calculated by combining (11) and (22),  
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Introducing (21) into (25) yields 
       
        
                            (26) 
Together with (19) and (20), we get 
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Then, 
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Thus,  
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Define  
                        
                                      
      
                                     
                     
Then, we have 
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To minimize    is equivalent to minimize  
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Calculate the derivative with respect to   
 , which gives 
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Solving the equation, we have 
  
   
  
          
  
    
                              (33) 
Introducing (33) into (30), we obtain 
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Since   
    is a row vector,   
       and   
    are 
scalars, the following transformation can be verified. 
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where the matrix  
  
[
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
   
  
    
    
  
   
  
    
 
    
  
   
  
    ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  (36) 
We further define 
     
  
       
  
    
 
Then, we have 
   ‖          ‖                     (37) 
This formula clearly shows that the residual can be 
attributed to two parts: the injected false data    and the term 
 . Without the injection of false data, 
   ‖ ‖                                      (38) 
From the perspective of an attacker, the goal is to construct 
an optimal attack vector    to maximize the resulting residual 
  . We rewrite (37) as 
   √
 
 
                                     (39) 
where 
               
           
To ensure the constraints of attacking amounts, for the 
terminal buses of the target line, 
            
                                  (40) 
           
                                   (41) 
where     is the equivalent power injections into the terminal 
buses used to simulate the line outage,     and     are the total 
false power injections at bus   and bus  , respectively.  
Introducing (19) into (40) and (41), which gives 
        
                      
           (42) 
        
                       
        (43) 
For the remaining load buses, we have 
                                      (44) 
Considering the false data    and applying the 
superposition law, we have 
                                      (45) 
Substituting (20) into (45), we have 
                                        (46) 
After this, the optimization problem of determining the 
optimal attack vector    to maximize the residual is 
formulated as a quadratic programming problem (47):  
   
 
 
                                    (47) 
subject to 
Constraints (42)-(44), (46), (9) 
                                           (48) 
                                           (49) 
The objective function maximizes the residual after false 
data    is injected. Constraints (48)-(49) ensures that if a 
PMU is installed at a bus, then the power injection at the bus 
and the power flows of lines connected to the bus cannot be 
attacked. Note that the objective function is quadratic and the 
constraints are all linear. So, it can be solved by available 
quadratic programming solvers. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In this section, we test the masking scheme using the IEEE 
39-bus system [22], which is composed of 39 buses and 46 
lines as shown in Fig. 3. We make the following assumptions 
 This system is fully measured. That is, we need one meter 
to measure the injection power for each bus and two 
meters to measure the power flow passing through each 
transmission line.  
 Five PMUs are installed at buses 4, 13, 18, 23 and 24, 
respectively. Once a PMU is installed at a bus, the power 
injection and flows of branches connected to the buses are 
measured. Thus, the power injection measurements at 
buses 4, 18, 23, 24 and line flow measurements on lines 4-
5, 4-14, 3-4, 10-13, 13-14, 22-23, 23-24, 23-36, 3-18, 17-
18 and 16-24 cannot be attacked. 
 An attacker can obtain the network information of the 
entire power network.  
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Fig. 3 IEEE 39-bus system 
 
In addition to those lines whose flows are monitored by 
PMUs, we also exclude from consideration those lines whose 
outages will lead to the disconnection of the entire power 
network, as no detection approach is reported to detect the 
outages of such lines. Hence, the remaining 24 lines are then 
considered for testing the proposed masking scheme.  
First, the outage of line 25-26 (i.e., k) is used to demonstrate 
the principle of the proposed masking scheme in detail. The 
PMU angle change vector before and after the line outage 
      is simulated using MATPOWER 4.1 based on the 
Alternating Current (AC) power flow model [22]. This is 
because the angle from the PMU measurement represents the 
actual phase angle at a bus in a real-world system that is 
described by the AC power flow. The original phase angle 
before the attack is calculated by (11), 
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Then, we disconnect line 25-26 and recalculate the power 
flow using MATPOWER. The post-outage phase angles at 
PMU buses become 
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So, the changes in the PMU phase angles due to the outage 
of line 25-26 are 
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                         (52) 
PMU data are assumed to be noise-free due to its high 
accuracy. Without loss of generality, the standard deviations of 
non-PMU measurements are set to 1% of the actual values. 
Table 1 ranks the top 5 lowest residuals determined by (17) 
without false data injection. We can see that the outaged line 
25-26 has the lowest residual 0.0346, less than half of that of 
the line ranked the second. Thus, the outage of line 25-26 can 
be detected using the detection method based on the PMU data.  
TABLE 1 TOP 5 LOWEST RESIDUALS BEFORE ATTACK 
rank Line    
1 25-26 0.0346 
2 1-2 0.1012 
3 16-19 0.1022 
4 2-3 0.1330 
5 5-8 0.1569 
 
Then, we solve the optimization problems (47) to get the 
false injection data into the measurements at load buses. The 
maximum attacking amount at a load bus is no more than 50% 
of the load (i.e.,  =0.5). For line 25-26, we have 
  
      
                               
         
The actual flow of line 25-26 is 65.41 MW(i.e., from bus 25 
to bus 26). However, as discussed in Section A, the proposed 
detection method will not use the actual value of line flow to 
simulate the line outage. Instead, the pre-outage line flow   
  is 
viewed as a variable for achieving the best match. The value of 
  
  determined by the optimization problem (47) is -391.82MW 
(i.e., from bus 26 to bus 25). Note that the determined   
  is not 
only different from the actual line flow, but the flow direction 
is also changed. So, according to (19),              . 
Then, the equivalent injected powers at the terminal buses used 
to simulate the outage of line 25-26 are 
    
                   
                           (53)          
Table 2 gives the injected false data for the terminal buses 
of line 25-26. The second column is the injected false load data. 
The third column represents the total false data needed to be 
injected at the terminal buses, which is the sum of the injected 
false load and the additional power used to simulate the outage 
of the line. The last column is the maximum attacking amount 
at a load bus. It can be seen from Table 2 that the injected false 
load data at buses 25 and 26 are -214.84MW and 396.34MW, 
which are greater than the maximum attacking amount 
112MW and 69.5MW, respectively. However, when the 
additional powers        MW,         MW are added into 
buses 25 and 26, the net additional power injections at buses 
25 and 26 become 112MW and 69.5MW, respectively. The 
attacking amounts at buses 25 and 26 are no more than their 
maximum attacking amount, so constraints (42) and (43) are 
satisfied. It is further verified that all the false data injections at 
load buses are summed to zero and limited within 
[         ].  
TABLE 2 FALSE INJECTION DATA AT TERMINAL BUSES 
Bus     
(MW) 
    or -
   (MW) 
    (MW)     
(MW) 
25 -214.84 326.84 112 112 
26 396.34 -326.84 69.5 69.5 
 
After the bad data is injected, the residuals of all candidate 
lines are recalculated using (39) and shown in Table 3. Similar 
to Table 1, only the top 5 lowest residuals are reported. It can 
be seen that the residual for line 25-26 ranks the fifth. 
Accordingly, its outage cannot be detected based the detection 
method in [19-20], which requires the outaged line to have the 
minimum residual. In addition, constraints (9)-(11) ensure that 
the injected false data follow KCL and KVL and the attacking 
amounts are also limited within a reasonable range to avoid 
being detected.  
TABLE 3 TOP 5 LOWEST RESIDUALS AFTER ATTACK 
rank Line    
1 6-31 0.0370 
2 7-8 0.0372 
3 26-29 0.0419 
4 13-14 0.0663 
5 25-26 0.0697 
 
Table 4 gives the simulation results of masking the outages 
of 24 lines (i.e., 1-2, 1-39, 2-3, 2-25, 5-6, 5-8, 6-7, 7-8, 8-9, 9-
39, 10-11, 10-13, 12-11, 14-15, 15-16, 16-17, 16-19, 16-21, 
17-27, 21-22, 25-26, 26-27, 26-28 and 26-29) for different 
values of  . The number in the bracket ranks the corresponding 
residual among those of the 24 candidate lines. It can be seen 
that the outaged line contributes to the minimum residual value, 
which indicates that its outage can be detected based on the 
calculated residual using (17). For a greater  , the residual    
will be increased. For example, when      , the residual of 
line 14-15 is 1.35; when      , the residual is increased to 
2.00. This can be explained by the optimization problem (47). 
As discussed, the objective of (47) is to maximize the value of 
the residual. As   increases, the attacking amount at a bus 
becomes larger according to constraint (42)-(44). Accordingly, 
the feasible region of the quadratic optimization gets larger, so 
its objective, the residual, will become larger.   
TABLE 4 RESIDUALS OF LINES FOR DIFFERENt   
Line                   
1-2 1.53(5) 1.63(5) 1.73(9) 
1-39 0.61(8) 0.68(8) 0.74(9) 
2-3 0.57(2) 0.63(2) 0.68(19) 
2-25 0.90(4) 1.05(5) 1.22(5) 
5-6 53.99(24) 58.62(24) 63.44(24) 
5-8 0.08(11) 0.09(11) 0.12(11) 
6-7 0.55(12) 0.63(12) 0.71(12) 
7-8 0.14(11) 0.18(12) 0.22(12) 
8-9 0.25(9) 0.29(10) 0.34(10) 
9-39 0.12(9) 0.14(10) 0.18(10) 
10-11 2.50(5) 3.11(8) 3.80(8) 
10-13 3.86(8) 4.52(9) 5.24(10) 
12-11 0.04(16) 0.14(16) 0.31(16) 
14-15 1.35(6) 2.00(6) 2.78(12) 
15-16 15.27(1) 17.31(1) 19.48(1) 
16-17 10.76(1) 12.09(1) 13.50(1) 
16-19 2.50 (12) 2.87(13) 3.54(13) 
16-21 0.28(1) 0.49(1) 0.81(1) 
17-27 0.03(14) 0.07(13) 0.12(10) 
21-22 1.57(1) 2.22(1) 2.98(1) 
25-26 0.07(5) 0.12(8) 0.17(20) 
26-27 0.59(1) 0.71(1) 0.85(1) 
26-28 0.04(13) 0.06(14) 0.10(14) 
26-29 0.15(19) 0.33(19) 0.61(19) 
 
We can also see from Table 4 that the injected false data can 
effectively mask the outages of lines. Overall, after false data 
are injected, the residual of line 2-3 ranks the second lowest 
and the lowest of the residuals of the other lines (except 15-16, 
16-17, 16-21, 21-22 and 26-27) rank the 4
th
. This indicates that 
the outages of these lines cannot be detected any more since 
the line with the minimum residual is presumed to be the 
outaged line. Additionally, there is a general trend that the rank 
of the residual of the outaged line increases as   increases. For 
instance, line 2-3 has the second lowest residual if      . 
However, when       and we inject the false data    
determined by (47), the residual is increased to 0.74, which 
ranks the 19
th
 lowest among the 24 candidate lines.  
TABLE 5 RESIDUAL OF LINE 26-27 
Rank                        
1 0.48 0.58 0.71 0.84 
2 1.63 1.70 1.56 1.21 
3 1.69 1.73 1.78 1.61 
 
It is observed that the outages of 5 out of the 24 lines under 
consideration (i.e., lines 15-16, 16-17, 16-21, 21-22 and 26-27) 
cannot be masked. This can be also explained by the 
optimization problem (47). Since the attacking amount    is 
limited within a certain range, the increase in the residual due 
to the false data is thus limited. So, if the minimum residual of 
the outaged line is much smaller than the second lowest one, 
then the false data might not be able to increase the residual of 
the outaged line such that it is greater than the second lowest 
one.  We use line 26-27 as an example to illustrate this point. 
This line has the minimum residual 0.48 when    , so its 
outage can be detected. When      , the residual is increased 
to 0.58, but it is still less than the second lowest one 1.70. So, 
the outaged of this line can still be detected although the 
attacker has injected false data to disrupt the line outage 
detection. The same trend applies for       and      . 
Hence, an attacker cannot inject false data to mask its outage. 
However, when   is further increased to 2.0 (not shown in 
Table 4), the residual of line 26-27 will rank the first. 
Accordingly, this outage of the line can be masked by injecting 
the false data. It is verified that the outages of lines 16-21 and 
21-22 can also be masked, when   is increased to 3.0 and 3.5, 
respectively.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Smart grids are subject to the high risk of cyber-attacks due 
to the highly integrations of communication networks. In this 
paper, we further propose a novel attack model to mask the 
outage of a single line by injecting false data into a set of 
measurements. A quadratic programming problem is set up to 
determine the optimal attack vector than can maximize the 
residual of the outaged line.  
The success of line outage detection depends on whether the 
outaged line can generate the minimum residual. Consequently, 
if the proposed attack scheme can increase the residual 
significantly, such an outage cannot be detected. This 
motivates us to develop more secure detection approaches for 
line outages and develop effective defending strategies against 
such attacks. This is still a very challenging problem to be 
addressed in a future work. 
In [14], we showed that an attacker only needs to obtain the 
network information of the attacking region instead of that of 
the entire power grid. This is done by making sure that the 
variations of phase angles of all boundary buses connected to 
the same island of the non-attacking region are the same. In 
[15], we further presented a heuristic algorithm to find an 
optimal attacking region which requires the reduced network 
information. In this paper, we assume that the attacker has the 
full network information of the power network. In the future 
work, we will investigate the possibility of launching such an 
attack based on local network information. We are also 
developing effective protection strategies against such 
topology attacks.  
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